Congressional Underappropriation
for Civil Juries: Responding to the Attack
on a Constitutional Guarantee
Jonathan Bunget
Separation of powers struggles often play themselves out
against a backdrop of great historic events: Lincoln's suspension of
habeaus corpus during the Civil War, for example, or Truman's
seizure of the steel mills as part of his effort to save an ally of redscare America from the Chinese. At these times, propelled by the
exigency of the circumstances, public officials test limits on their
power that they might otherwise respect. Recently, however, a separation of powers conflict pitted two branches of the federal government against each other through one of the most routine tasks
known to modern government: ordering the national budget.
Congress appropriated only $43.4 million, rather than the originally requested $46.2 million, for the payment of jury fees and
juror expenses in fiscal year 1986.1 Because of the difference between the requested and the granted appropriations, it appeared in
early June of 1986 that the funds available to pay jurors would be
exhausted before the end of the fiscal year on Septemiiber 30. If the
funds eventually were exhausted, the Anti-Deficiency Act,2 which
bars United States officers and employees from obligating the federal government to make payment for which no money has been
appropriated, and 28 U.S.C. § 1871, which provides for the payment of jury fees and expenses, would arguably combine to prohibit judges from empaneling any juries until Congress appropriated additional money.
On June 12, 1986, the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, at the direction of the Executive Committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, issued a memorandum
stating that because Congress failed to appropriate sufficient funds
for juror payment, "civil jury trials will have to be suspended on
June 16 through the end of the fiscal year (September 30) ...
t A.B. 1984, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.
I Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, Pub.L.No. 99-180, 99 Stat. 1136, 1154 (1985).
2 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
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[T]he Judicial Conference has directed that you empanel no new
civil juries from June 16 forward . . . [T]his suspension. . must
continue in effect until we inform you that sufficient funds have
been made available." 3 While juror expenses were not exhausted at
the time of the memorandum, the Administrative Office issued its
directive to ensure that federal courts would have sufficient funds
to empanel criminal juries.4
In two cases, Armster v. United States5 and Hobson v. Bren6
nan, civil litigants successfully sought to have juries empaneled
after June 16, despite the June 12 Administrative Office memorandum. While influenced by the litigants' seventh amendment right
to a jury trial in civil cases, the Hobson court rested its decision
primarily upon statutory grounds, holding that since funds for juror expenses were not yet exhausted, neither the Anti-Deficiency
Act nor the Administrative Office memorandum prohibited judges
from empaneling jurors in civil cases where a suspension would
create undue hardship.' The Armster court, however, bypassed the
statutory questions on the grounds that they had not been adequately briefed, and held that the three month suspension of civil
jury trials violated the litigants' seventh amendment right to a jury
trial.8
Since the money for juror expenses never actually ran out, the
Armster court never had to consider whether courts could compel
the federal government to pay jurors in the absence of funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Nonetheless, Armster's
holding that a three month suspension of jury trials would be unconstitutional suggests that if the money had in fact run out, the
courts still would be required to empanel juries, thereby obligating
Congress to make the necessary payments.
If Congress cuts civil jury trial funding again, how should the
federal courts, or a litigant denied a civil jury trial, respond?' Part
I L. Robert Mecham, Memorandum to All United States District Judges, Subject: Suspension of Civil Jury Trials (June 12, 1986), quoted in Armster v. United States, 792 F.2d
1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). The Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States are part of the judicial
branch.
Id. at 1426.
5 792 F.2d 1423.
6 637 F.Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1986).
Id. at 175.
8 792 F.2d at 1430.
1 It is likely that Congress will decide to cut funds for civil jury trials again since the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act motivates Congress to trim the national budget wherever
possible. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub.L.No. 99-177,
7
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I of this comment considers and rejects the possibility, suggested
by some state courts, that the judiciary has a self-executing power
to appropriate funds to satisfy its own budgetary needs. Part II
argues that the seventh amendment obliges Congress to pay necessary juror expenses as part of the government's general duty to
provide litigants in federal court with civil juries. Part II also argues that a federal court faced with a civil case where a litigant has
been denied a jury has the authority to enforce the seventh amendment's affirmative obligation. Part III demonstrates that federal
courts have standards by which they can evaluate whether a civil
jury trial delay should be treated like a civil jury trial denial.

I.

THE STATE COURT APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE UNDERFUNDING:
THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURTS TO APPROPRIATE

A.

The Inherent Power Doctrine as Applied and Defined by State
Courts

When faced with inadequate funding from the legislative
branch, some state courts have argued that they possess an inherent power to set their own budgets and to order the appropriation
of public funds to satisfy those budgets. 10 State courts applying
this principle generally have justified it through two similar arguments. First, courts have argued that the very existence of the judiciary requires that it have the ability to appropriate funds necessary for its survival. Second, courts have argued that failure to
recognize such inherent power would jeopardize the state constitutions' separation of powers by making state courts fiscally dependent upon the legislature.
In asserting that the very existence of the judiciary requires a
power to appropriate public funds, state judges have relied on
state constitutions that both create general jurisdiction state
courts and also guarantee access to those courts. Because their
1985 U.S.Code Cong. and Admin. News (99 Stat.) 1037 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 401).
10 State court inherent power issues have arisen in other contexts as well. See, for ex-

ample, Baten v. State, 101 So.2d 869, 875 (Fla.App. 1958) (court does not have inherent
power to delay imposition of a two year criminal sentence for one year); In Re Pruitt, 249
Ga. 190, 288 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1982) (trial court has inherent power to punish for contempt
but not to exceed limits imposed by the legislature for contempt penalties); In Interest of
E.C., 130 Wis.2d 376, 387 N.W.2d 72, 77 (1986) (trial court lacks inherent power to order
police department to expunge police records of juveniles); State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis.2d
569, 297 N.W.2d 808, 816 (1980) (trial courts lack inherent power to dismiss criminal cases
with prejudice before jeopardy attaches); Jacobson v. Avestruz, 81 Wis.2d 240, 260 N.W.2d
267, 270 (1977) (trial court has inherent power to assess costs of empaneling jury on parties
who settled claim after counsels' opening statements).
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state constitutions are structured in this manner, these judges have
contended that they must have the inherent power to ensure their
courts' survival by appropriating money necessary for their courts'
continued functioning. In O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of County of
Worcester," for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a lower court judge had the authority to bind his
county contractually for the price of a tape recorder and four tapes
needed by the judge in his courtroom. The O'Coins court reasoned
that all Massachusetts judges have the inherent power to bind
their local governments for "expenses reasonably necessary for the
operation" of their courts. 2 According to O'Coins, "[i]t would be
illogical to interpret the Constitution as creating a judicial department with awesome powers over the life, liberty, and property of
every citizen while, at the same time, denying to the judges authority to determine the basic needs of their courts as to equipment,
facilities and supporting personnel."'"
More commonly, state courts justify use of the inherent power
doctrine to appropriate public funds by claiming that the inherent
power doctrine is necessary to promote the state constitution's separation of powers. Without the inherent power doctrine, these
courts argue, the separation of powers doctrine has no fundamental coherence: the legislative branch might conceivably destroy the
judicial branch by inadequately funding the judiciary, or the legislature, through its ability to deny funding, might coerce the courts
into passively affirming all of the legislature's actions.
In a leading inherent power case, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 4 for example, the judges of the Philadelphia common
pleas court brought suit against the mayor of Philadelphia seeking
funds for administration of the common pleas court in fiscal year
1970. The city had allotted the common pleas court five million
dollars less than the judges had requested. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the common pleas judges had the inherent
power both to determine the amount necessary for the operation of
the pleas court and to compel payment of that amount.
Tate argued that if the Pennsylvania courts did not have this
inherent power, the legislature might destroy the state constitution's separation of powers by destroying the judiciary. "Unless the
legislature can be compelled by the Courts to provide the money
11362

Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972).
12 287 N.E.2d at 611.
13 Id. at 612.
14 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971).
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which is reasonably necessary for the proper functioning and administration of the Courts, our entire judicial system could be extirpated, and the legislature could make a mockery of our form of
government with its three co-equal branches."15
Other courts advocating the inherent power doctrine have
pointed to a second separation of powers concern: that the legislature might use its control over the judiciary's funds to influence
the courts' judgments. In Carlson v. State,'6 for example, a judge
in Hammond, Indiana presented the city council with a budget for
the operation of the city court which the council refused to pay.
Holding that the local court had the power to set its budget, including salaries, the Indiana Supreme Court argued that "[o]ur
sense of justice tells us that a court is not free if it is under financial pressure, whether it be from a city council or other legislative
body, in the consideration of the rights of some individual who is
affected by some alleged autocratic or unauthorized official action
of such a body. One who controls the purse strings can control how
tightly those purse strings are drawn, and the very existence of a
17
dependent.'
Because of its constitutional stature, the inherent power doctrine serves as a lever by which the courts can demand payment of
their expenses even during times of fiscal crisis affecting the government as a whole. In Tate, for example, the court acknowledged
Philadelphia's financial difficulties but nevertheless argued that
"the deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia must yield to
the constitutional mandate that the judiciary shall be free and independent and able to provide an efficient and effective system of
Justice."'"

274 A.2d at 199.
1 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966).
17 220 N.E.2d at 534. In Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963), the Colorado Supreme Court made a similar argument. In that case, the judges of a Colorado district
court had sent a list of requested court employee salaries to their county commissioner.
Refusing to approve the requested salaries, the commissioner set the court employees' salaries according to the pay scale used for all other county employees. The Smith court affirmed the district court judges' inherent power to set court employees' salaries and required
the county commissioner to follow the judges' determinations. The court argued that "[it is
not only exiomatic [sic], it is the genius of our government that the courts must be independent, unfettered, and free from directives, influence, or interference from any extraneous
source. It is abhorrent to the principles of our legal system and to our form of government
that courts, being a coordinate department of government, should be compelled to depend
upon the vagaries of an extrinsic will." 384 P.2d at 741.
1s 274 A.2d at 199. See also id. at 202 (Pomeroy concurring):
No evidence is required to establish that the government is at all levels experiencing
severe financial strains. As the opinion of the Court points out, however, the court
'
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State courts applying the inherent power doctrine have agreed
on the doctrine's substantive content: it empowers state courts to
compel public appropriation for "reasonable and necessary" expenses related to the judicial function.' 9 Courts exercising their inherent power need not demonstrate that they had to invoke the
power in order to perform their constitutional duties (for example,
in order to provide litigants with due process of law). Rather, reviewing courts characteristically have upheld lower courts' use of
their inherent power to compel public appropriations in any situation where the appropriation relates to the court's day-to-day functioning. Reviewing courts, for example, have upheld lower courts'
exercise of their inherent power to set salaries for supporting personnel, to requisition space needed for courtroom facilities, and
even to demand that the executive provide an operator for the
courthouse elevator. 20
Reviewing courts have not required lower courts to demonstrate that the legislative alternative to the court's exercise of inherent power would necessarily have harmed the court. In Carlson
v. State, for example, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the city
court's exercise of its inherent power to set court employees' salaries even though the city council proposed a reasonable alternative-that the county pay court employees according to the same
scale as all other county employees. 2

system in Philadelphia is not just another competing cause or need; it is itself a separate branch of government, co-equal with the executive and legislative branches headed
by the defendants in this case. The distinction is not one of degree, but of kind. No
doubt the courts must be mindful, in making the estimates of their financial needs, of
the needs of the total community and of the problems of the legislative branch in funding them; but the courts having made their determination as being reasonably necessary to performance of their constitutional functions, it is not for the legislative branch
to deny the reasonableness or the necessity on the ground that something else is more
urgent or more important.
19 See, for example, Board of County Commissioners v. Judicial Space, etc., 378 So.2d
1247 (Fla. 1979) (court has the inherent power to requisition "necessary" space); Judges for
the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436, 441 (1969)
(courts have the power to obligate the county contractually for items of expense "necessary
to the effectively continuing functioning of the court"), modified by 386 Mich. 1, 190
N.W.2d 288 (1971); In re Clerk Court's Compensation of Lyon County v. Lyon County Commissioners, 308 Minn. 172, 241 N.W.2d 781 (1976) (if established procedures fall, court may
appropriate funds it needs as a "practical necessity" to perform its judicial function).
10 See Board of Commissioners of Vigo County v. Stout et al., 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683
(1893) (elevator case), and cases cited in note 19.
21

220 N.E.2d at 532.
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B. The Inherent Power Doctrine Should Not be Applied in the
Federal Context
Extended to the federal government, the inherent power doctrine would stand for the proposition that the Constitution implicitly grants the federal courts authority to "self-execute" 22 their
own budget demands by bypassing Congress and appropriating
public funds for the courts' operating expenses. The federal courts
would have this authority because the federal judiciary exists as an
independent governmental entity, and because Congress might
otherwise frustrate the constitutional checks and balances system
by underfunding of the federal courts.
This section argues that the federal courts should not use the
inherent power doctrine as a response to Congressional underfunding of civil juries. Two difficulties preclude application of the inherent power doctrine in the federal appropriation context. First,
the Constitution's text argues against recognition of the courts' inherent power to appropriate public funds. Second, acceptance of
the judiciary's inherent power to appropriate funds would create a
dangerous precedent likely to produce harmful economic and political consequences; the Supreme Court has recognized this danger
and has refused to uphold broad, self-executing powers in related
contexts.
1. Textual Problems.
a. Congress' appropriationspower. Article I provides that "No
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law" and says that "All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. 2 This
language which explicitly locates the power to make federal appropriations exclusively in Congress denies the federal courts any inherent power to appropriate public funds.
In National Association of Regional Councils v. Costle,24 for
example, the D.C. Circuit, although admitting that equity favored
22

When state courts use their inherent powers to appropriate funds, they "self-exe-

cute" their budget demands rather than suing for a judgment to execute those demands. If
displeased with the legislature's appropriation, state court judges need not demonstrate
their legal entitlement to the extra money in a court of law: by virtue of the inherent power
doctrine, the judges have the immediate power to override the appropriation by sending a
writ of mandamus to the state treasury. See 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 78 at 440 ("The phrase
'inherent powers' is used to refer to powers included within the scope of a court's jurisdiction which a court possesses irrespective of specific grant by constitution or legislation. Such
powers can neither be taken away nor abridged by the legislature.").
23 U.S.Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; Id. at § 7.
2.4 564 F.2d 583 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
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the lower court's decision, reversed a district court order because it
had, in effect, ordered an appropriation from the U.S. Treasury not
supported by law. Pursuant to the Water Pollution Control Act,
Congress had directed the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in fiscal years 1973 and 1974 to distribute a sum of appropriated funds among state and regional agencies formed to oversee
waste treatment management plans. The EPA failed to spend all
of the allocated money, and an association of regional agencies
sued demanding that the EPA pay out the remaining funds. Even
though the EPA's budgetary authority to spend these funds had
expired at the time plaintiffs brought suit, the district court held
that because the EPA had failed to take full advantage of the congressional appropriation in 1973 and 1974, the court could reinstate the EPA's budgetary authority to spend these funds through
1977.
Admitting that the EPA had frustrated congressional intent
by letting its budgetary authority die before spending the waste
treatment management funds, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless reversed the lower court. The court held that "any order of the court
to obligate public money conflicts with the constitutional provision
vesting sole power to make appropriations in the Congress." The
court explained that "[e]quity empowers the courts to prevent the
termination of budget authority which exists, but if it does not exist, either because it was never provided or because it has terminated, the Constitution prohibits the courts from creating it no
matter how compelling the equities. '2 5 The district court erred because it had ordered an appropriation that had no basis in law,
either statutory or constitutional.
Arguably, however, a federal court might assert that an inherent power to appropriate funds is authorized by law. As state
courts have argued in related contexts, the creation of three coequal branches in the federal Constitution-the "paramount
law" 2 -- confers upon all three branches the power to appropriate
money. Accepting this structural argument, however, nullifies Article I's grant of exclusive appropriation power to Congress. If the
25 564 F.2d at 589. See also United States v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 744

F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984), vacating 588 F.Supp. 132 (N.D.Il. 1984) (vacating district court
order calling for executive branch to lobby Congress for funds); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Martin
B. McNamara, and Irwin F. Sentilles III, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 Yale
L.J. 1286, 1289-90 (1972) ("A judicial requisition of funds from a taxing agency, such as a
county or city, is in essence a judicial arrogation of discretion conferred, for better or worse,
on the popularly-elected branches of government.").
26 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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judiciary and the executive both have the power to appropriate
federal funds, then against whom is the congressional appropriation power exclusive?
b. Congress' plenary control over the inferior federal courts.
The Constitution vests Congress with plenary power to create or
disband inferior federal courts; this suggests that the Constitution
cannot be read to imply that lower federal courts must have an
inherent power to order the appropriation of public funds in order
to ensure their own survival. Although the Federal Constitution
establishes a tripartite form of government, and although the
framers enthusiastically supported the separation of powers,2 8 Article III specifically delegates to Congress the authority to vest the
federal judicial power in such inferior federal courts "as the Con'29
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Supreme Court, moreover, consistently has held that Congress not only has the power to create inferior federal courts but
also may exclude from the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
categories of cases to which the federal judicial power extends. The
Court has stated that "[t]he Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' ",s
In Sheldon v. Sill,3' for example, Congress had withdrawn
lower federal court jurisdiction from diversity cases where the diversity was created by an assignment of rights, thereby precluding
'7 This argument

does not apply to the Supreme Court, because the Constitution man-

dates that Court's existence. U.S.Const. art. III, § 1.
IS See Federalist 48 and Federalist 51 (Madison), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist
332, 347 (1961).
2 U.S.Const. art. III, § 1. Although initially a question for debate, the view that the
Constitution does not mandate that Congress create inferior federal courts has prevailed.
See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
ViU.L.Rev. 1030, 1031 (1982). The provision granting Congress plenary power over the inferior federal courts resulted from a compromise between those framers who "thought that the
Constitution itself should establish a full set of federal courts, and those who thought that
the Constitution should authorize no federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court
whatever." "The central premise of the compromise," according to Professor Bator, "was
the insight that the question whether a given 'federal' case should initiate in a state court
(subject to Supreme Court review), or in a lower federal court, is not an appropriate question for a decision at the constitutional level. Rather, Congress is the body best suited to
make this institutional judgment on the basis of changing circumstances." Id.
o Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943), quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236,
245 (1845).
U

49 U.S. 441 (1850).
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the lower federal courts from hearing a category of cases within the
federal judicial power. The Sheldon Court, upholding the Congressional action, argued that since the Constitution vests Congress
with the power to prescribe inferior federal courts, "Congress may
withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no
jurisdiction but such as the statute confers." 2
One cannot consistently contend that the Constitution grants
Congress plenary power to create and define the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts while also arguing that the Constitution creates an inherent power in the lower federal courts to guarantee
their own survival by appropriating public funds. Unlike the
United States Constitution, many state constitutions mandate the
creation of general jurisdiction courts. State courts have emphasized this aspect of their constitutional plans when applying the
inherent power doctrine.3 3 Unlike state courts, the lower federal
courts are subject to Congressional control at every point, from
their very existence to the types of cases they may hear. While it
may be legitimate to infer a self-protecting appropriation power
deriving from state constitutions' creation of independent state
courts of general jurisdiction, no such inference is legitimate in the
federal context.
2. Dangerous Precedent. The inherent power doctrine as defined by state courts in the appropriation context represents a very
expansive power. Acceptance of the doctrine means that courts
may appropriate public funds for purposes having only an attenuated connection to the courts' constitutional responsibilities.
By allowing courts to bypass the legislative branch and "selfexecute" their own budget demands, the doctrine promotes fiscal
irresponsibility. All sectors of government frequently receive less
than ideal financing and must respond by making difficult sacrifices, but the inherent power doctrine provides courts with a constitutional deus ex machina, rescuing the judiciary from this sectarian strife. The doctrine allows the judiciary to forget budget
consciousness. By investing courts' day-to-day spending with constitutional significance, the inherent power doctrine "diverts attention from the truly critical budgeting task facing the courts: choosing priorities among goals and objectives, since there will never be
sufficient funding to do everything that might reasonably be
32

49 U.S. at 449.

33 See, for example, Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1983).
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thought necessary in an ideal system of justice."3' 4
The judiciary's use of the inherent power doctrine to reprioritize the budget so that the judiciary gets whatever it needs is not
cost free. By reducing funds available for other governmental operations, the judiciary's use of the doctrine damages other governmental institutions to the degree that it benefits the judiciary.
Granting the judiciary the autonomy to demand public funds for
its operating expenses creates the risk that the judiciary might
abuse the power for socially undesirable ends. For example, a district court might decide to build a more spacious courthouse and,
assuming that appropriating money for a new courthouse fell
within the courts' inherent power, Congress might then have to cut
the enforcement of food and drug regulations or transfer money
that Congress had initially budgeted to aid inner-city schools.3 5
Proponents of the inherent power doctrine might argue that
the possibility of fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the federal
courts cannot possibly have much impact on the government's
overall economic health, because money spent on the courts comprises such a small percentage of the government's total budget.3 "
Even assuming that the judiciary's limited needs would not pose a
serious economic threat, recognizing an inherent power to appropriate funds would presage serious economic dangers: recognizing
this power in the judiciary would imply the existence of a similar
self-executing power in the executive branch.
The same separation of powers arguments that justify the inherent spending power in the judiciary also justify an inherent
34 Hazard,

McNamara, and Sentilles, 81 Yale L.J. at 1291 (cited in note 25).
Part II of this comment argues that courts can enforce the seventh amendment's
requirement that Congress provide funds for civil jury trials. Arguably, this may cause Congress to pay for civil jury trials by diverting money that might have been spent for what
many would consider more socially useful purposes. This comment takes the position that
because the Constitution is binding law, Congress cannot dispose of constitutional guarantees through value judgments but rather must wait for a constitutional amendment before
refusing to fund civil juries.
' The size of the federal judiciary's budget should not be underestimated, however; for
the fiscal year 1984, the federal courts administered a budget of $875,104,000. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, The United States Courts: A Pictorial Survey, chart
14 (1984). For the argument that recognizing state courts' inherent power to appropriate
funds will not produce fiscal chaos because state courts have limited needs, see Morgan
County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So.2d 830, 853 (1974) (Hefiin dissenting).
Tate, however, illustrates that despite their limited functions, courts, if given the inherent
power to appropriate funds, might use the power to make damaging appropriations. 274
A.2d at 200. In that case, the common pleas court employing the inherent power doctrine
demanded $ 2.46 million for five months' expenses from financially strapped Philadelphia's
treasury.
31
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spending power in the executive. If the Constitution entitles the
judiciary to appropriate its own funds because the Constitution
creates an independent judiciary and because otherwise the legislature, through inadequate funding, might prevent the judiciary
from carrying out its constitutional function, then the Constitution
must also entitle the executive to appropriate funds because the
Constitution creates an independent executive and because otherwise the legislature, through inadequate funding, might prevent
the executive from carrying out his or her constitutional function.
Recognizing the judiciary's inherent power to appropriate
public funds, then, would vest the President with the power to bypass Congress and self-execute his or her own budget demands.
The President must, for example, have the power to appropriate
money for the military because otherwise, Congress might prevent
the President from carrying out his or her responsibilities as com37
mander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The logic of the inherent power doctrine might possibly be extended even further. If the Supreme Court, for example, recog-

1 U.S.Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
With the exception of Tate, 274 A.2d 193, the elevated constitutional rhetoric employed
by state courts when advancing the inherent power doctrine has not reflected the gravity of
the particular appropriations at issue. The doctrine has been asserted predominately by
state courts making marginal appropriations for ancillary personnel and facilities. Hazard,
McNamara and Sentilles have argued that state court reliance on the inherent power doctrine "may be shortsighted and unwise" because in the cases recognizing the power, the
party whose appropriation has been challenged' (usually the legislature but sometimes the
executive) has not had sufficient motivation to protest fully:
In the minority of cases where the judiciary has proceeded against the state legislative
or executive branch in a direct contest, the issue involved has always been specific,
narrow, and relatively minor. Although the state's executive and legislative branches
are directly confronted, they are not challenged in any vital way. Acquiescence to the
doctrine of inherent power appears to follow from a considered unwillingness to pursue
the contest further, rather than any real disability to do so. There is a reluctance to
jeopardize the tripartite structure of government over a few dollars for a janitor's or a
stenographer's salary.
81 Yale L.J. at 1287-89 (cited in note 25).
It might be argued, therefore, that although as a doctrinal matter the inherent power
doctrine frees government officials to self-execute their budgetary requests unchecked, experience at the state level suggests that officials vested with this power will not abuse it. However, state courts might not have taken full advantage of the inherent power doctrine simply
because most states have not yet definitively accepted the doctrine. Moreover, some state
judges, unlike their federal counterparts, must seek reelection: "[Tihere comes a time when
a judge or any other public official must make an accounting to the voters for his actions, if
arbitrary, extravagant, or not in the public interest, and that is true of a city judge or any
judge in the State." Carlson v. State, 220 N.E.2d at 536. Even though recognition of the
inherent power doctrine has not led to devastating results at the state level, federal courts
should not create the potential for abuse of power at the federal level by recognizing the
federal courts' inherent power to appropriate funds.
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nized the inferior federal courts' inherent power to appropriate
public funds, could the Court contain this precedent within the appropriation context? Or would this precedent stand for the broader
proposition that the federal judiciary has the inherent power to
take any action the judiciary decides it needs to take in order to
meet its constitutional responsibilities? If this precedent comes to
stand for this broader proposition, how could the Court deny that
the Constitution also gives the President the power to take any
action he or she deems necessary to fulfill his or her constitutional
responsibilities, even an action explicitly proscribed by statute?
The Supreme Court has recognized the danger implicit in acknowledging broad self-executing inherent powers. For example, in
a seminal separation of powers case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer ("The Steel Seizure Case"), 8 the Supreme Court refused to read inherent powers into the Constitution's delegation of
responsibilities.
In that case, President Truman, fearing that a nationwide
steel strike would cripple America's effort in the Korean War, ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take control over most of the
nation's steel mills. Truman claimed that his power to seize the
mills derived from "the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution," specifically his power as commander-in-chief and his
power to execute the laws. 9
The majority rejected this argument. Emphasizing the danger
implicit in recognizing the autonomy sought by President Truman,
the Court first declined to read the power to seize the mills into
the President's responsibility as commander-in-chief: "Even
though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to
take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes
from stopping production."40 Next, the Court rejected President
Truman's executive power argument, refusing to accept Truman's
broad definition of the power to execute the laws: "The President's
order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President."' 1
Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown argued
38
39

343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 587.

,0 Id.
41 Id. at 588.
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that "presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.""2
Jackson grouped exercises of presidential power under three models. In the first model, where the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, presidential authority is at its maximum. Cases where the President acts in absence of
any specific congressional pronouncement comprise the second category; "[iun this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend
on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law."'4 3 Jackson's third and
most problematic category contains cases where the President acts
contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress. Jackson argued that "[c]ourts can sustain exclusive presidential control in
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is
'
the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."44
Significantly then, the Court has recognized that separation of
powers concerns disfavor recognizing the President's-or by the
same principle the judiciary's-ability to act directly contrary to
Congressional will. The judiciary's exercise of an inherent power to
appropriate public funds would fall within Jackson's problematic
third category: presumably, inferior federal courts would only exercise their inherent power when, in the courts' view, congressional
appropriations were inadequate.
Jackson's concurrence undermines the theoretical justification
for recognizing the courts' inherent power to appropriate public
funds. State courts have argued that they need the inherent power
to appropriate public funds because otherwise the legislature
might subvert the judiciary's independence; in order to preserve
the state constitutional separation of powers, each branch must remain capable of surviving without the other two. Jackson's approach toward separation of powers is more functional: rather than
discussing the need for each branch's autonomy, Jackson implies
that any action that disrupts the traditional allocation of responsibilities among the three branches offends the federal separation of
powers. Rather than requiring each branch's complete independence, the federal separation of powers seeks precisely to create a
system of interdependence, limiting each branch's power by leav42 Id. at 635 (Jackson concurring).

4'Id. at 637 (Jackson concurring).
Id. at 637-38 (Jackson concurring).
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ing each branch dependent upon the other two.4 5 Granting the federal courts the power to bypass the legislature by way of self-executing budget proposals would defeat this constitutionally created
separation of powers.
II.

THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AS AN ENFORCEABLE LIMIT
ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION POWER

Part I of this comment argued that the federal courts do not
have a self-executing power to appropriate their budget demands
because the Constitution vests the appropriation power exclusively
in Congress. Arguing that Congress has the exclusive power to appropriate does not, however, mean that the Constitution places no
limitations on Congress' exercise of that power. The Constitution
frequently both grants a power exclusively to a particular branch
of government and limits that branch's exercise of the exclusive
power: the executive, for example, has the exclusive power to carry
out the laws, but the eighth amendment prohibits the executive
from eliciting confessions through torture.
Part II of this comment argues that the seventh amendment
places a limitation on Congress' appropriation power. That amendment places an affirmative duty upon the federal government to
provide civil jury trials in federal court where a jury trial would
have been available at common law at the time the Constitution
was ratified. If the government is to comply with this constitu" Madison shared Jackson's belief that the federal separation of powers creates an interdependence among the three branches rather than three autonomous entities. Madison
wrote that the constitutional separation of powers "goes no farther than to prohibit any one
of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department." Federalist 47,
in Cooke, ed., The Federalist 323, 328 (cited in note 28). See also Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 539 (1833) (a limitation of powers could be
best accomplished by an occasional mixing of those powers); Charles Louis de Montesquieu,
The Spirit of the Laws, 150-160 (Harner ed. 1949) (interdependence is essential to any general division of powers because no group of men can be relied upon to limit their own
powers).
Jackson's interpretation of the federal separation of powers does not imply that state
courts that have recognized an inherent power to self-execute their budget requests have
incorrectly interpreted their state constitutions. Federal law might inform a state court's
interpretation of its own constitution but, as long as no federal rights are implicated, federal
law does not control the interpretation of a state constitution. State courts have the prerogative, therefore, to read their state constitutions as requiring each branch of their state government's complete independence. See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its
Nature and Purpose 11 (1961) (the reformers of the Michigan state constitution "may not
anticipate all the situations where some departure from the separation principle is warranted. It [therefore] may be more suitable simply to recognize the separate departments in
the Constitution, and leave the implications of the separation principle to be worked out on
the basis of experience and judicial construction.").
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tional duty, Congress must provide the necessary funds. As a result, this comment takes the position that in an instance where a
federal district court denies a litigant a civil jury trial because of
congressional underfunding, the Constitution authorizes a reviewing court to order the district court to empanel a jury. The district
court should then empanel a jury and send the bill for jury empaneling to Congress. 46 Part II of this comment considers two issues. The first issue is whether, as an institutional matter, a federal
court should reach the merits on a claim that the seventh amendment places a limitation on the appropriation power. The second
issue is whether the seventh amendment both requires the government to provide litigants in federal court with a civil jury trial and
requires Congress to provide the necessary money for empaneling
juries.
A.

The Threshold Question: Justiciability

Part I of this comment concluded that the Constitution grants
Congress the exclusive power to appropriate public funds. Arguably, this conclusion compels an ancillary one: if the Constitution
gives Congress the exclusive power to appropriate, then the Constitution must also intend for the appropriation power to remain immune from judicial review, even if the Constitution places restrictions on Congress' exercise of that power.
The Court's opinion in the seminal political question case,
4 7 might be
Baker v. Carr,
read to support this position. In that
case, the Court listed the factors likely to indicate a nonjusticiable
political question, stating in dicta that "[p]rominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." 8
4 If Congress refuses to pay the jury empaneling expenses, the jurors should sue the
government for their salaries and expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) grants district courts
jurisdiction of any "civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in
amount, founded . . . upon the Constitution." Since jurors are presently paid $30.00 per
day, plus some expenses, and receive these payments twice monthly, the $10,000 amount
limit would not present any problems. See 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1982) (covering payments to
jurors).

47 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
48 Id. at 217. The other factors listed by the Baker Court were a "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it [the dispute]; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government, or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
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Baker, then, arguably indicates that the Constitution's commitment of the appropriation power to Congress precludes judicial
enforcement of constitutional limitations on that power, and some
courts in fact have held that the Constitution immunizes appropriation decisions from judicial review. 49 Reading the Baker dicta this
forcefully, however, conflicts with the long history of judicial review in this country and specifically contradicts the Court's holdings in a number of cases where the Court has reached the merits
of claims that Congress has exercised its appropriation power
unconstitutionally.
Accepting the argument that the federal courts may not review acts representing exercises of powers granted exclusively to
another branch goes far toward destroying the courts' ability to
question the constitutionality of any federal government action.
Practically every power granted in the Constitution is "exclusive. '"" The Constitution, for example, grants Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce, but no one would argue that this
grant implies that federal courts have no power to intervene if
Congress passes a law denying blacks and whites equal access to
markets. Likewise, the Constitution grants the President exclusive
authority to execute the laws, but federal courts routinely decide if
federal law enforcement agents have complied with the fourth
amendment.5

multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id.
The Court subsequently has suggested that a showing of a "textually demonstrable
commitment" might standing by itself be conclusive. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 518-49 (1969); Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 208, 217 (1987) (reading Powell in this manner); Herbert
Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1959).
This comment takes the position that these other factors are irrelevant in the present context because courts routinely decide issues similar to appropriations for civil juries, and because courts do have standards by which they can evaluate the constitutionality of a denial
or delay in empaneling a civil jury. These standards derive from the seventh amendment
and the analysis set out in Part III of this comment.
49 See, for example, Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft, 60 F.Supp. 985 (S.D.Cal. 1945)
("Any attempt by the judicial branch to interfere with the exclusive [appropriation] powers
of Congress would be a plain invasion of the powers of said body conferred upon it by the
Constitution of the United States.").
50 Ironically in light of the Baker dicta, courts consistently decline to review constitutional challenges to the war making power, which is one of the few powers arguably granted
to more than one branch. U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress has power to declare war);
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President is commander-in-chief). See, for example, Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (Cambodian bombing nonjusticiable); Atlee v.
Laird, 347 F.Supp. 689 (E.D.Pa. 1972) (legality of Vietnam War nonjusticiable).
51See, for example, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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The above analysis suggests that Courts cannot accept the
principle that constitutional challenges to congressional appropriations decisions are nonjusticiable merely because the Constitution
grants the power to appropriate to Congress alone. This argument
depends upon the consequences of reaching a contrary conclusion:
if exclusivity of power indicates a nonjusticiable political question,
then judicial review of federal government action no longer exists.
This argument from consequences is weaker, however, if courts can
distinguish between the appropriation power and other exclusive
powers by arguing that the Constitution's text contains a special
emphasis on the exclusivity of Congress' appropriation power. The
Constitution lists Congress' appropriation power in the same manner as it enumerates the other powers granted Congress: "The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes. . .and provide for the common Defence and the general Welfare." 52 But the
Constitution arguably distinguishes between the appropriation
power and other congressional powers by making a later reference
to the exclusivity of Congress' power to appropriate in Article I,
Section 9: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."5 3
Although this textual distinction could be relevant, Supreme
Court precedent indicates that it does not matter. By reaching the
merits in a number of cases challenging the constitutionality of
congressional appropriations, the Court has implicitly rejected the
argument that attacks on appropriations decisions are nonjusticiable. In U.S. v. Will, 54 for example, the Court reached the merits of
a class action brought by federal judges. The judges argued that
the 1979 congressional appropriation for federal judges' salaries offended the compensation clause "5 by repealing previously enacted
salary increases. Never mentioning the possibility of nonjusticiability, the Court immediately addressed the constitutional question:
"when, if ever, does the Compensation Clause prohibit the Congress from repealing salary increases that otherwise take effect automatically pursuant to a formula previously enacted?" 56
Likewise, in the earlier case of Flast v. Cohen,5 7 the Court
reached the merits of a claim that Congress had violated the estab52

U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl.11.

U.S.Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
449 U.S. 200 (1980).
U.S.Const. art. III, § 1 ("Judges . . .shall. . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office").
56449 U.S. at 221.
57 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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lishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment by partially financing religious schools. The Court explicitly stated that
the first amendment cabins Congress' appropriation power: "the
Establishment Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against
such potential abuses of governmental power, and that clause of
the First Amendment operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending
power conferred by Art. I, Sec. 82" 1 The Flast Court implicitly
recognized its authority to enforce these constitutional limits: although failing to find a violation of the religion clauses, the Court
confronted the constitutional issues rather than declining consideration on nonjusticiability grounds.
In sum, then, both the American tradition of judicial review in
general and Supreme Court precedent reviewing congressional appropriations in particular suggest that courts may decide claims
that the government has denied a litigant his or her seventh
amendment rights due to underfunding of juries. This conclusion
seems especially true in light of the controversy here. Underlying
the political question doctrine is a sense that some issues are inappropriate for judicial resolution."' By contrast, the situation
here-judicial enforcement of a bill of rights provision against one
of the political branches-represents the paradigmatic example of
a correct and appropriate exercise of judicial review. The issues
presented by the seventh amendment are not political questions
because the rights of citizens against the government are at stake,
not the rights of the judiciary against another branch.
Even advocates of judicial restraint recognize that courts play
a legitimate and necessary role when they protect personal liberties
explicitly listed in the bill of rights against the encroachment of
one of the political branches. Judge Robert Bork, for example, has
argued that the source of judicial review's legitimacy limits its
proper scope. Although countermajoritarian, judicial review is jus58Id. at 104.
5,See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 184 (1962) ("Such is the
foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the political-question doctrine: the Court's
sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue
and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which
tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c)the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally. . . the inner
vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no
earth to draw strength from."). See also Fritz W. Sharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517, 567 (1966) (application of the political
question doctrine justified when the court cannot reach an intelligent decision because it
lacks access to necessary information).
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tified when courts act pursuant to explicit provisions in the bill of
rights because these provisions represent society's consent "to be
ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring
principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of
majorities by, the Constitution."' 0
Likewise, a restrictive, process-based theory of judicial review
would accept court enforcement of the seventh amendment. This
view tries to reconcile the countermajoritarian nature of judicial
review with the Constitution's decision to create a democratic system of government by suggesting that judicial review is appropriate if it facilitates the efficacy of the democratic process-if it, for
example, protects people's abilities to participate in the democratic
process."' The civil jury system represents a check upon abuse of
the democratic process incorporated in the Constitution by its
framers.62 If the democratic process fails and special interest
groups manage to impose their will upon the majority through law,
a jury composed of a cross-section of the community can, for various reasons, refuse to enforce the law.
B.

The Substantive Argument: The Seventh Amendment Places
an Affirmative Obligation on the Government to Provide Civil
Litigants in Federal Court with a Jury

Assuming that a court can enforce the seventh amendment
even if, in so doing, the court overturns a congressional appropriations decision, does the seventh amendment actually place an obligation on the government to provide civil litigants in federal court
with juries, and a consequent obligation on Congress to provide
funds for those juries? This section first demonstrates that federal
litigants have a right to a jury trial in appropriate cases. It then
tries to reconcile this conclusion with the understanding, held by
some, that the Constitution does not impose affirmative obligations
on the government.
1. The Seventh Amendment Applies to FederalProceedings.
By its terms, the seventh amendment does not mention federal
courts; rather, it guarantees the right to jury trial "[i]n suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
"0Robert

H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47

Ind.L.J. 1, 3 (1971).
61 See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
61 See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 Minn.L.Rev. 639 (1973).
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dollars. '6 3 Conceivably, state courts might satisfy this constitutional guarantee: litigants have access to general jurisdiction state
courts, and state courts provide civil juries.6 4 Because the seventh
amendment creates a waivable personal right rather than imposing
a jurisdictional mandate upon courts, the federal district courts
have authority to adjudicate common law civil claims absent a
jury. 5 Conceivably then, in a system where state courts provide
civil juries and where state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, a litigant, by deciding to appear in federal court, might
implicitly waive his or her seventh amendment right. The relevant
question here, therefore, is whether the seventh amendment specifically requires that federal courts provide civil jury trials.
The Supreme Court believes that the seventh amendment
guarantees civil litigants in federal court the right to a jury trial.
Language in Supreme Court opinions frequently describes the civil
jury trial right as an essential prerogative of the federal court system. 6 And, a number of Supreme Court holdings imply that the
63U.S.Const. amend. VII.
4 Some courts and commentators who have questioned the sanctity of the right to a
jury trial might argue that state courts satisfy the seventh amendment guarantee. Some
courts have carved out exceptions to the seventh amendment's applicability in federal court,
see note 68, and commentators have long criticized the civil jury's efficacy. See generally,
Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949). Some commentators, moreover, have suggested that a
federal judge should honor a civil litigant's jury demand only when the judge determines
that the litigant's trial will be unfair without a jury. One commentator has stated that
courts should "take into account the disappearance of conditions that in the 18th century
required the protection of the vox populi in civil matters. According to this view, the common law jury's function was very specifically to protect citizens from unfair trials, and if a
jury would not protect people from unfair trials, then its use would be dysfunctional." Mary
Kay Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 Hastings L.J. 1, 2 (1976).
'5 See, for example, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 299 (1930) (a court "has
authority ...to accept the waiver, and, as a necessary corollary, to proceed to the trial and
determination of the case with a reduced number or without a jury." Id. at 299. See also
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (a party may contractually waive his right to jury trial); Fed.Rule Civil Proc. 38(d) (a party waives his or her
right to a jury trial unless the party demands a jury in accordance with the procedures
outlined in the Federal Rules); Perego v. Dodge, 163 U.S. 160, 166 (1896) (prior to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a party waived his right to a jury trial if he failed to make a timely
objection to a bench trial).
'6 See, for example, Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1941) ("[T]he right
of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of
federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute,
should be jealously guarded by the courts."); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-110 (1891)
("In the Federal courts this (jury) right cannot be dispensed with, except by the assent of
the parties entitled to it, nor can it be impaired by any blending with a claim, properly
cognizable at law, of a demand for equitable relief in aid of the legal action or during its
pendency. Such aid in the Federal courts must be sought in separate proceedings, to the end
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Court believes federal litigants have a civil jury trial right.6 7 The
lower federal courts apparently share this belief: appellate and district courts frequently consider whether cases exist where the court
should deny a federal litigant's civil jury demand. The attempt to
identify these cases implies an underlying rule that the seventh
amendment guarantees the federal litigant a civil jury trial in all
but exceptional circumstances.6 8
Possibly because the belief in a federal civil jury trial right

that the right to a trial by a jury in the legal action may be preserved intact."); City of
Morgantown v. Royal Insurance Co., 337 U.S. 254, 258 (1949) ("The Constitution guarantees
to litigants in the federal courts the right to have their cases tried by juries, and Rule 38 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly implements that guarantee. Denial of the right in a
case where the demanding party is entitled to it is of course error.").
67A number of Supreme Court decisions stem from the threshold assumption that the
seventh amendment applies in federal courts. In Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), for
example, the Court upheld a Montana district court's practice of empaneling six rather than
twelve person juries in civil cases. To determine whether the Montana practice violated the
seventh amendment, the Colgrove Court applied a loose version of the seventh amendment
historical test, see note 71, concluding that the reduction in jury number from twelve to six
did not offend the seventh amendment because the reduction did not alter the "substance"
of the 1791 common law civil jury trial.
By going through this historical test, the Colgrove Court presumed the seventh amendment applied in federal court. If the seventh amendment did not necessarily apply in federal court, the Colgrove Court might have quickly dismissed the plaintiff's claim by arguing
that the plaintiff waived his seventh amendment rights when he chose to appear before a
federal six person jury rather than the standard twelve person jury provided by Montana's
courts.
See also Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891); Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. 271,
278 (1856) (both indicating that there is a constitutional right to jury in federal court).
68 See In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (court
refused to recognize a complexity exception to civil jury right even though the jury would
have to read over 100,000 pages and trial would take approximately two years); SRI Intern.
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1131 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (Markey and
Newman joining in opinion and adding additional views) ("The district court, in announcing
its decision to deny a jury trial and employ a bench trial, said 'these questions' could be
resolved in that way 'more economically and expeditiously.' But whether judicial economy
and expedition might be served is irrelevant. The Seventh Amendment contains no 'economy' exception.").
Some courts, however, have carved out a complexity exception to the seventh amendment based primarily on due process grounds. See, for example, In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3rd Cir. 1980) ("denials of jury trial on
grounds of complexity should be confined to suits in which due process clearly requires a
nonjury trial.. . . It is not enough that trial to the court would be preferable. The complexity of a suit must be so great that it renders the suit beyond the ability of a jury to decide
by rational means with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the applicable legal
rules."); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines, 458 F.Supp.
423, 444-49 (N.D.Ca. 1978), aff'd on other grounds as Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machines, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420
F.Supp. 99, 103-08 (W.D.Wash. 1976); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc. 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). See generally Jeffrey Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in
Complex Litigation, 34 U.Miami L.Rev. 243, 289 (1980).
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pervades the federal judiciary as an institution, Supreme Court
and lower federal court opinions treat the federal civil jury trial
right in appropriate cases as a given and neglect to explain the
right's source or justify its continued existence. Therefore, although these opinions support the position that the federal courts
must provide civil juries, they do not conclusively establish this
right. The Constitution's text, however, demonstrates that federal
civil litigants have the right to a jury trial. In addition, Congress
itself has recognized this principle-if federal courts need not provide civil juries, then large chunks of the present statutory framework governing the relationship of state and federal courts would
yield unconstitutional results. Finally, a system in which only state
courts provide jury trials might unconstitutionally inhibit exercise
of seventh amendment rights.
a. Textual Argument. Like the other liberties contained in the
bill of rights, the seventh amendment did not apply to the states at
the time it was ratified. 9 If the amendment did not apply in state
courts, the framers must have intended for the amendment to apply in federal courts.
A possible response to this argument might be that the framers intended the seventh amendment to serve as a fallback provision: the amendment would obligate federal courts to furnish jury
trials in civil cases only if state courts failed to do so. The Constitution's limit on federal jurisdiction undercuts this reading of the
seventh amendment, however. Because cases falling within federal
jurisdiction comprise such a small subset of the cases falling within
state courts' general jurisdiction, the federal courts may only provide civil juries to a small percentage of litigants denied juries by
state courts. If the framers had intended the seventh amendment
to safeguard against the denial of the jury trial right in general
jurisdiction common law courts, then the framers would have made
an exception to the limited federal jurisdiction in circumstances
where the state courts refuse to honor the common law civil jury
trial right.
More likely, and as the history surrounding the enactment of
the seventh amendment bears out, the framers proposed the seventh amendment because they recognized the importance of the
"

Minn. & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). Although the Court

has held that other bill of rights' provisions bind state governments through the fourteenth
amendment, the Court has not included the civil jury trial right in this category. See Walker
v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) (neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the due
process clause makes the seventh amendment applicable to the states).
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civil jury trial right at common law and sought to incorporate that
right into the federal system. The federalists agreed to include the
seventh amendment in the bill of rights as a concession to the antifederalists, who had been clamoring for a new constitutional convention. The anti-federalists' motivation for seeking adoption of
the seventh amendment indicates that the framers intended the
seventh amendment to apply in federal courts. First, the anti-federalists feared that without the seventh amendment, British creditors might take advantage of federal alienage jurisdiction and sue
American debtors before federal judges likely to be more sympathetic to the creditors than state court juries. Second, the anti-federalists sought to guarantee that American citizens could sue fed70
eral officials before juries.
b. Rules governing the relationshipbetween state and federal
courts. Courts should read the seventh amendment as guaranteeing federal litigants the right to demand a civil jury for a second
reason. Any other reading would seriously disrupt the existing
body of jurisdictional and procedural rules that organize litigation
in the federal and state courts.
(1) Choice of forum and removal. The seventh amendment
guarantees civil jury trial in suits at "common law" and, under the
Supreme Court's historical test, guarantees civil jury trial in claims
grounded in federal statutes that codify causes of action recognized
by the common law in 1791, the year of the seventh amendment's
adoption. 1 Under existing federal law, which binds state courts
through the supremacy clause, a plaintiff has an absolute right to
bring suit in federal court if the plaintiff can fit his or her cause of
action within the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction. Similarly,
a defendant may remove an action brought against him or her if
the plaintiff originally could have brought suit in federal court.72
Because the jurisdictional grant frequently extends to both common law actions and actions based on statutes that codify the 1791
common law, the existing choice of forum and removal statutes
would work an unconstitutional result in a system where only state
courts provide civil juries. These statutes would allow one party,
by insisting upon federal adjudication, to frustrate the other
party's demand for a jury trial in a suit within the scope of the
70

See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh

Amendment, 57 Minn.L.Rev. at 673-705 (cited in note 62).
71 See, for example, Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 155; Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
288 (1930).
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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seventh amendment."5
Diversity jurisdiction 7" represents the most obvious path by
which common law claims reach federal court. If only state courts
provide civil juries, one party might use diversity jurisdiction to
prevent the other party's access to a jury in even the most paradigmatic common law suit. An Illinois citizen, for example, complaining that his Wisconsin neighbor's tree had fallen on his land
and damaged his property, 75 might bring a diversity action in federal court and thereby prevent the Wisconsin defendant from defending this suit before a jury. If the Illinois plaintiff sued the Wisconsin defendant in an Illinois state court, the Wisconsin
defendant could remove the case to federal court and prevent the
Illinois plaintiff from prosecuting his tort claim before a jury.
In a system where only state courts provide civil juries, the
grant of federal jurisdiction in cases "arising under" federal law76

would also create potential conflict with the seventh amendment.
Since that statute extends federal jurisdiction to all cases arising
under federal law, the statute by definition confers federal jurisdiction over statutory actions that codify 1791 common law rights.
Arising under jurisdiction, therefore, in a system where only state
courts provide civil juries, provides another mechanism by which
one litigant might deny a second litigant's right to jury trial over a
cause of action protected by the seventh amendment.
An injured railroad worker, for example, may sue his or her
employer in federal court under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA) for damages resulting from the employer's negligence.
Prior to the FELA's enactment, the employee would have sued his
employer for common law negligence; FELA preempts and modifies these common law actions (for example, FELA eliminates assumption of risk as a defense)." Applying the Supreme Court's
historical test, the railroad company defendant plainly has a sev11 A further problem would develop under the one exception to the normal removal
rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) provides that even if diversity exists between the parties, a defendant may not remove a suit if the plaintiff brings the suit in a state court of the defendants home state. If only state courts provide civil jury trials, this provision allows a diversity plaintiff to decide, regardless of the defendant's wishes, whether trial should proceed
before a judge in federal court or before a jury in a state court of the defendant's state. By
discriminating in favor of plaintiffs, a system where only state courts provide civil juries not
only offends the seventh amendment but also may violate the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. U.S.Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
7' 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
7' See The Thorns Case, Y.B. Mich. 6 ed. 4, f. 7, pl. 18 (1466).
76 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
7 45 U.S.C. § 53.
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enth amendment right to a jury trial because the common law has
long recognized negligence actions by an employee against his employer. But, in a system where only state courts provide civil jury
trials, the plaintiff, by virtue of the federal arising under jurisdiction, might frustrate the defendant's seventh amendment right by
suing the railroad in federal court. Conversely, if the employee had
brought suit against the railroad in state court, the railroad might
have used the removal laws, coupled with the arising under statute,
to deny the plaintiff's seventh amendment right by forcing the
plaintiff to litigate in federal court.
(2) Exclusive jurisdiction. If only state courts provided civil
jury trials, then many statutes would be patently unconstitutional
where they both codify 1791 common law actions (and therefore
come within the seventh amendment's purview) and provide for
exclusive federal jurisdiction. This suggests, then, that not recognizing a right to a civil jury trial in federal court will invalidate
large chunks of Congress' remedial plan.
Federal copyright law, for example, preempts actions that
copyright holders could bring at common law prior to the federal
statute's enactment-for example, actions for unfair competition8
According to the Supreme Court's historical test, litigants suing
under the copyright statute or defending against actions brought
under the statute have a seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
If the federal system did not include jury trials, one could argue
that the copyright statute as a whole is unconstitutional, because it
forces litigants to argue 1791 common law causes of action in a
forum which does not provide civil jury trials.
c. The possibility of an unconstitutionalburden. Even if state
courts did satisfy the seventh amendment guarantee and even if
Congress could amend the framework governing the relationship
between state and federal courts so that a system where only state
courts provided jury trials would not directly offend the seventh
amendment, such a bifurcated system still might be unconstitutional. Specifically, it would burden seventh amendment rights by
discouraging litigants from asserting those rights if they wished to
enter federal court.
"Arising under" federal jurisdiction was intended to shield
federal law from local bias; diversity jurisdiction was intended to
shield foreign litigants from local prejudice. 9 In a system where
See generally Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright 251-52 (2d ed. 1979).
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945); Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809).
78
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only state courts provided juries, a foreign litigant, a plaintiff seeking enforcement of a federal cause of action, or a defendant asserting a federal defense would have to balance his or her interest in
an unprejudiced trial against his or her preference for a jury trial.
If state courts satisfy the seventh amendment and federal courts
refuse to provide civil juries, then the system systematically and
unconstitutionally inhibits litigants from exercising their seventh
amendment rights to jury trials. Accepting a similar argument, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson,s° struck down part of
the Federal Kidnapping Acte' after finding that the Act "discouraged" litigants from demanding jury trials. The Kidnapping Act
allowed a jury to impose the death penalty on a defendant the jury
found guilty of kidnapping under certain conditions, but the statute set forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty if the
defendant waived jury trial or plead guilty. Holding that the Act
impermissibly burdened the exercise of the criminal defendant's
sixth amendment right to a jury trial, Jackson argued that, "the
evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty
pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages
them.""2
While the Court in Jackson may have been especially sensitive
to a burden on the defendant's sixth amendment right because the
death penalty was involved, one can infer from Jackson that if an
institutional system discourages litigants from exercising their
rights to jury trials, then the system is unconstitutional. The logic
favoring recognition of "chilling effects" in general justifies this
conclusion: if the Court did not accept claims based on inhibitions
placed on the exercise of rights, individuals could not attack statutes or systems that frustrate the expression of constitutional
rights through disincentives rather than direct deprivation.8 3
2. Imposing the Affirmative Obligation on the Government
and, More Specifically, on Congress. If the seventh amendment
applies to federal proceedings, does this amendment impose an obligation on government to provide civil juries and an obligation on
Congress to appropriate the requisite funds? This subsection argues that the seventh amendment must impose these affirmative

8o 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
81 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
82

390 U.S. at 583 (emphasis in original).

88 See, for example, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) ("The chilling ef-

fect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.").
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obligations, because otherwise the amendment lacks any substance.
Some courts and commentators have argued that the Constitution does not grant positive rights, meaning that the Constitution does not obligate the government to take any action or to provide any services. Rather, according to these commentators, the
Constitution serves solely as a negative charter, prohibiting the
government from acting in conflict with the principles embodied in
the Constitution. 4
Many constitutional provisions are negatively phrased. It
makes sense in these instances to argue that the Constitution only
restricts government action. Professor Currie has written, for example, that "the due process clause is phrased as a prohibition, not
an affirmative command: 'nor shall any State' is the equivalent of
'a State shall not.' Moreover, what the states are forbidden to do is
to 'deprive' people of certain things, and depriving suggests aggressive state activity, not mere failure to help."' 5 As a textual matter,
the seventh amendment differs from provisions like the due process clause because the seventh amendment is not negatively
phrased. By requiring that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," the amendment implies government action: the government must continue to act as it did prior to the bill of rights'
enactment.
More importantly, if the seventh amendment does not impose
an affirmative obligation on government to provide litigants with
civil jury trials, then the amendment is meaningless. With provisions like the due process clause, the positive and negative rights
distinction works. If, for example, the due process clause does not
grant an affirmative right to assistance from the government for
the exercise of a right, the clause still has some content because
alternative means of engaging in the protected activity exist. The
Court's dicta in Harris v. McRae illustrates this point:
Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference
with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may
be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom....
84 See Judge Posner's dicta in Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.
1983) ("The Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.. . . The men
who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the
people but that it might do too much to them."). See generally, David P. Currie, Positive
and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.Chi.L.Rev. 864 (1986).
'5 Currie, 53 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 865.
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It cannot be that because government may not prohibit the
use of contraceptives .. . or prevent parents from sending
their child to a private school, .
government, therefore, has
an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives or
to send their children to private schools. To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due Process
Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require
Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an
indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted a medicaid
program to subsidize other medically necessary services. 6
This logic does not apply to the seventh amendment. Because dispute resolution in the courts is under government's exclusive control, the Constitution's command that government shall preserve
the right of trial by jury is useless if government does not also have
a concomitant duty to provide litigants with civil juries.
In other, more subtle cases, the Court has held that constitutional provisions mandate governmental assistance where the
rights embodied in the provisions would be meaningless without
governmental intervention. In Bronson v. Kinzie8 7 for example,
"the Court held that a state could not destroy a mortgagee's foreclosure right by denying him an effective remedy."88 In Bronson,
the Court interpreted the contracts clause to require the state government to protect the mortgagee's claim against the mortgagor. If
the state could withdraw remedies, then the state could impair
contractual obligations: "no one, we presume, would say that there
is any substantial difference between a retrospective law declaring
a particular contract or class of contracts to be abrogated and void,
and one which took away all remedy to enforce them or encumbered it with conditions that rendered it useless or impractible to
pursue it."'

9

0 the Court "held that a state
Similarly, in Truax v. Corrigan,"
could not constitutionally forbid injunctions against picketing by
striking workers." As one explanation for its holding, the Court
reasoned that "by withdrawing the injunctive remedy, the state

86448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)(upholding the Hyde Amendment's restrictions on public
funding for abortions).
87 42 U.S. 311, 320 (1843). This comment's discussion of Truax and Bronson paraphrases Professor Currie's treatment of the two cases, 53 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 875.
88 Id. at 875.
89 42 U.S. at 317. Quoted in Currie, 53 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 875 n.66.
,0 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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had deprived the employer of property without due process of
law." Here, as in Bronson, the Court imposed an affirmative governmental duty because the Court recognized that "[p]roperty, like
contract, entails a right against third parties that is worthless without government help." 91
Courts should apply the logic of Bronson and Truax to the
seventh amendment context. These holdings illustrate the need for
recognition of an affirmative constitutional duty on Congress to
provide funds for civil jury trials because, like the right to property
and contract, the right to a civil jury trial is meaningless without
government assistance.
III. WHEN DELAY BECOMES DENIAL: THE SEARCH FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

Part II argued that the seventh amendment imposes an affirmative duty on government to provide civil jury trials. Congress,
however, is more likely to decrease funds available for civil juries
than to stop funding civil juries altogether. At what point does an
appropriation that merely slows the rate of civil jury trials work an
unconstitutional result? Part III of this comment argues that the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine provides a standard that
federal courts can use when deciding whether to treat a civil jury
trial delay as a civil jury trial denial.
A.

There is No Constitutional Right to a Speedy Civil Trial

The Justice Department argued in both Armster and Hobson
that the budget shortfall and the resulting suspension of civil jury
trials did not violate any constitutional right because, although the
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy
trial, a civil litigant does not enjoy a similar right. The Armster
court explicitly rejected this argument, holding that because the
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of jury trials, litigants have a constitutional right to a speedy civil trial: "Specifically, we conclude that the seventh amendment right to a civil jury
trial is violated when, because of such a suspension, an individual
is not afforded, for any significant period of time, a jury trial he
would otherwise receive."9 2 The court also held that the period of
over three months challenged in Armster constituted "far more

S1

Currie, 53 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 876.

92

792 F.2d at 1430.
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than a significant period."' 3
The Armster court's creation of a speedy civil jury trial right
lacks textual and precedential support and should not be used as a
basis for challenging congressional underfunding of civil juries.
First, Armster runs contrary to the text of the Constitution since
the sixth amendment, the only section of the Constitution which
refers to "a speedy and public trial,""" guarantees this right only in
criminal cases. And, the text of the seventh amendment, although
vesting civil litigants with the right to a jury trial, does not provide
civil litigants with a right to a speedy trial.9 5 Second, although various Supreme Court decisions have emphasized the importance of
the civil jury system, the Court never has recognized the right to a
speedy civil jury trial. The Court surely has had an opportunity to
create such a right, because delay in the federal civil system is a
widespread and well known phenomenon.9 6
Finally, the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in its
enforcement of the sixth amendment right to a speedy criminal
trial do not support recognition of a similar right in the civil context. The Supreme Court has justified the speedy jury trial right
not by pointing to events that might occur if either a criminal or a
civil jury trial was delayed, such as ordinary inconvenience to the
parties, but by focusing on injustices that are unique to criminal
97
cases.

If the speedy trial right for criminal defendants did not exist,
the government could violate an arrestee's due process rights by
forcing him or her to serve a substantial sentence before trial. Justice Brennan in Dickey v. Florida argued that the speedy trial
clause "is intended to spare an accused those penalties and disabilities-incompatible with the presumption of innocence-that may
spring from delay in the criminal process."98 The fear that litigants
will be deprived of their liberty prior to a jury trial does not arise
in the civil context where, except in rare cases such as deportation

93 Id.
amend. VI.
96 U.S.Const. amend. VII.
"6 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 96 (1985) (after filing,
federal litigants in 1983 had to wait, on average, 19 months until disposition; in 1960, federal
litigants had to wait, on average, 17.8 months).
' Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969). See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S.
354, 361-62 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86 (1905); and cases cited in notes 98100.
9, 398 U.S. 30, 41 (1970)(Brennan concurring). See also United States v. Ewell, 383
U.S.
116, 120 (1966) (speedy trial right "is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial").
9U.S.Const.
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and juvenile proceedings, the government does not infringe upon
the civil litigant's freedom either before, during, or after trial.
Because the government stigmatizes the criminal defendant by
accusing him or her of a crime, the Supreme Court has also argued
that the right to a speedy criminal trial is necessary because it ensures that the defendant does not experience unnecessary anxiety.
In Klopfer v. North Carolina,for example, the Court insisted that
the speedy trial right is necessary in the criminal context because
criminal prosecution may subject a person to "public scorn and deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular
causes.""9 The fear of stigmatization that motivates application of
the speedy jury trial right in criminal cases carries over into the
civil context in a reduced number of cases and to a far lesser degree. A party accused of breaching a contract, for example, suffers
significantly less social embarassment than a criminal defendant.
Finally, the Court has argued that the speedy trial right
"serves the public interest by penalizing official abuse of the criminal process and discouraging official unlawfulness."' 10 0 Deterrence
of official misconduct is, in general, not a relevant consideration in
the civil context where the government does not characteristically
instigate the suit and is often not directly effected by the suit's
outcome.
Although delay in proceedings may inconvenience civil litigants, civil delay clearly is less harmful than criminal delay. The
case for extending the speedy trial right to the civil context therefore is unconvincing.
B. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Provides a Standard for Evaluating the Constitutionality of Jury Trial Delays
Assuming that there is no constitutional right to a speedy civil
jury trial, do courts have any standard by which they can judge the
constitutionality of a civil jury trial delay? 01 This section argues
that, faced with a situation where, because of underfunding, a civil
jury trial empaneling is significantly delayed but not completely
denied, courts should apply the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine and treat the delay as an effective deprivation of the litigant's
seventh amendment right. The unconstitutional conditions doc" 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967).
100 Dickey, 398 U.S. at 43 (Brennan concurring).
101 If a court did not possess standards for evaluating the constitutionality of a civil
jury trial delay than the issue would arguably be a political question. See note 48.
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trine "holds that government may not condition the receipt of its
benefits upon the nonassertion of constitutional rights even if receipt of such benefits is in all other respects a 'mere privilege.' "''o
The theory underlying the doctrine is that government should not
be able to accomplish indirectly, through the conditioning of government-granted benefits, that which express constitutional provisions forbid it to do directly.10 3 The government cannot, for example, condition the granting of a government job on the government
employee's agreement not to exercise her right to an abortion.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply in the
case where the government delays civil jury trials due to underfunding. In this instance, the government is conditioning the
granting of a benefit, timely access to the federal courts, on the
litigant's waiver of his or her seventh amendment right.10 If a civil
litigant, for example, has to wait six years for a jury trial but only a
year for a bench trial, a court should find that the government has
denied the litigant his or her seventh amendment right because the
government has effectively coerced the litigant to waive a civil jury
trial through the conditioning of a benefit. 0
The Supreme Court established the unconstitutional condi0°
tions doctrine in Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission,'
where the Court held that the federal government could not condition the use of the nation's highways on a private carrier's agreement to convert to a public carrier. Since Frost,two versions of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine have emerged. The strong
version says that the state may never condition the granting of a
benefit on a person's agreement not to exercise a constitutional
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-8 at 510 (1978).
William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1439, 1445-46 (1968).
104 This argument assumes that when faced with underfunding for civil juries, courts
will decide to continue granting timely bench trials rather than needlessly delaying bench
trials so that the wait for bench trials equals the wait for jury trials.
oI'
In certain circumstances, the argument might be made that litigants have a due
process right of access to federal courts. In these cases, then, it may be misleading to refer to
court access as a "benefit" conferred by the government. Nonetheless, for purposes of the
unconstitutional conditions analysis, there is no difference between a case where the government conditions a granting of a benefit on waiver of a constitutional right and a case where
the government conditions a constitutional right on the waiver of another constitutional
right. See United States v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 348 (7th Cir. 1983) (unconstitutional conditions doctrine "precludes the government from coercing the waiver of a constitutional
right. . by conditioning the exercise of one fundamental right on the waiver of another.");
Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 Iowa L.Rev. 741, 745-58 (1981).
102

103

100 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
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right. A slightly weaker version provides that government may only
condition the granting of a benefit on a waiver of a constitutional
right when government has a compelling interest that justifies the
condition.'0 7
The Court's opinion in Garrity v. New Jersey,10 8 illustrates its
application of the doctrine's strong version. In Garrity, the Court
held that New Jersey could not threaten to fire police officers suspected of wrongdoing who refused to testify during an investigation of their actions. Rejecting the contention that the condition
was justifiable if New Jersey could demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring the police officer's testimony, the Court stated that
coercion was "inherent in this scheme of questioning . . [w]here
the choice is 'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other."1 0 9
In other cases, however, the Court has considered arguments
that the state had a compelling reason to condition the granting of
a benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right. In Sherbert v.
Verner, 10 for example, the Court invalidated a South Carolina law
that withheld unemployment benefits from persons who made
themselves less attractive to potential employers by refusing to
work on Saturdays for religious reasons. The Court, however, implied that the South Carolina law would have passed constitutional
scrutiny if South Carolina had presented a compelling state interest justifying the condition: before announcing its holding, the
Court distinguished Sherbert from an earlier case by arguing that
the state regulation at issue in Sherbert did not further a substantial, legitimate state interest."'
Similarly, in Branti v. Finkel,"2 the Court held that the first
amendment prevented the state from discharging an assistant public defender solely because of his political beliefs. The Court indicated, however, that in certain circumstances a compelling state interest might justify this type of firing: "If the First Amendment
protects a public employee from discharge solely based on what he
has said, it must also protect him from discharge based on what he
believes. Under this line of analysis, unless the government can
demonstrate 'an overriding interest,' . . . 'of vital importance,'...
107 Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L.Rev. 977, 979-80, 980

n.2-3 (1986).
108 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
109 Id. at 497-98.
110 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
...Id. at 408-09, distinguishing Sherbert from Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
112

445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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requiring that a person's private beliefs conform to those of the
hiring authority, his beliefs cannot be the sole basis for depriving
him of continued public employment."' 13
Supreme Court precedent indicates, then, that if the court reviewing a civil jury empaneling delay applies the strong version of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the court need not evaluate the federal government's interests in underfunding for civil juries. A substantial delay in jury trials relative to bench trials will
itself be unconstitutional. A court might, however, apply the
weaker version of the doctrine; in this circumstance, should the
court find that the government has a compelling interest justifying
the time lag between bench and jury trials?
The government's major interest in underfunding of civil juries is the saving of money. In the unconstitutional conditions context, courts cannot accept the principle that these savings justify
the government's conditioning of a benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right. As an analytic matter, accepting this argument
would allow the government to condition the granting of any benefit X on the waiver of any constitutional right Y where the exercise
of right Y requires either directly or indirectly an expenditure of
public funds. Under this reasoning, the government could, for example, condition the granting of federal jobs on prospective employees' agreement not to vote because paying voting inspectors
and setting up voting booths costs the government money. Or, to
take an equally extreme example, the government could condition
the payment of social security benefits on recipients' agreement
not to object to federal agents' unconstitutional searches and
seizures because compliance with the fourth amendment costs the
government money both in officer training and in wasted investigations. In other contexts, the Court has denied that saving money is
a compelling state interest justifying the government's abrogation
of constitutional rights."4
Under either line of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,

113

Id. at 515-16.

114

See, for example, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Court rejected fiscal

integrity as a compelling governmental interest that could overcome a burden imposed on
the right to travel by a state welfare program's residency requirement).
Even if saving money by itself is a compelling state interest, the government must use
the least restrictive means to pursue this interest when denying litigants their seventh
amendment rights. See, for example, Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 ("[E]ven if the possibility of
spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would
plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.").
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the government deprives a litigant of his or her seventh amendment right when it coerces the litigant to "waive" this right by allowing the litigant timely access to court only after a jury trial
waiver. How should courts apply this doctrine to varying civil jury
empaneling delays?
In light of Frost Trucking, the crucial inquiry must be
whether the government has coerced the litigant to waive his or
her seventh amendment right by structuring the litigant's choices
so that the litigant feels compelled to accept an earlier bench
trial. 1 5 By incorporating the coercion standard, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine avoids the problem that might result if
any disparity between the scheduling of a bench trial and a jury
trial created a seventh amendment cause of action: a brief delay
will not coerce the defendant to surrender his or her seventh
amendment rights. Presumably for example, a court would find
constitutional a time differential no longer than the present difference between the wait for a civil jury trial and the wait for a bench
trial, since all seem to assume that the present system does not
compel litigants in federal court to accept bench rather than jury
trials.116
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than responding to congressional underappropriation
for civil juries by recognizing a self-executing appropriation power
in the judiciary, courts must accept the limitations placed on their
power by the Constitution. The interdependence of the branches,
however, implies not only that the government's structure places
limitations on the judiciary's power, but also that the structure
places limits on the power of the political branches.
This comment argues that the seventh amendment limits Congress' appropriation power by imposing upon Congress an affirmative obligation to finance appropriate civil jury trials in federal
court. Faced with situations where litigants are denied civil jury
trials because of underfunding, federal courts should remedy these
constitutional violations by empaneling civil juries and sending the
bill to Congress.

16

Frost, 271 U.S. at 583.
For statistics on present delays see note 96.

